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A commentary on
High reward makes items easier to
remember, but harder to bind to a new
temporal context
by Madan, C. R., Fujiwara, E., Gerson,
B. C., and Caplan, J. B. (2012). Front.
Integr. Neurosci. 6:61. doi: 10.3389/fnint.
2012.00061
Rewards optimize future behavior by
enhancing memory of events relevant to
wellbeing. But how do rewards received
in one context affect subsequent learn-
ing about the information previously
associated with rewards? Updating exist-
ing knowledge is important to maximize
rewards: when high-value stimuli are rein-
forced by reward in a new situation,
contextual binding will support optimal
decision-making later; however, contex-
tual unbinding can also improve wellbeing
by preventing low utility associations from
being formed.
Previous work indicates that initial
emotional associations can impair later
novel associations (Mather and Knight,
2008; Novak and Mather, 2009). To
explore whether monetary rewards elicit
memory impairments or enhancements,
Madan et al. (2012) used a series of value-
learning tasks to examine the effects of
reward on explicit memory, implicit mem-
ory, and contextual binding. Consistent
with earlier studies using emotional stim-
uli, high-value words were better recalled
than low-value words on both implicit and
explicit memory tests. Moreover, high-
value words were more difficult to bind
to a new temporal context, as measured
by relatively later word output during free
recall of a list. Interestingly, though free
recall was equal for high- and low-value
items, high-value words tended to proac-
tively interfere with current list memory.
These findings add to a growing litera-
ture showing that arousal can sometimes
enhance and sometimes impair memory
for context (see Mather and Sutherland,
2011), yet to date there is no neural model
that can account for these dual effects.
Below we discuss potential neural mecha-
nisms that may help explain Madan et al.’s
finding that rewards, much like other
forms of arousal, impair subsequent con-
text binding and proactively interfere with
memory.
Motivationally significant events
trigger release of the catecholamines,
dopamine (DA) and norepinephrine (NE),
which optimize central resource allocation
to ensure that such events are remem-
bered (McGaugh and Roozendaal, 2002;
Adcock et al., 2006). However, how these
brain systems sometimes lead to mem-
ory impairment is less understood. One
possibility is that the mnemonic effect
of arousal depends on the predictive
value or goal-relevance of a salient item’s
context (Mather and Sutherland, 2011).
Catecholamines are thought to broad-
cast prediction errors across the brain,
providing a mechanism by which arousal
can either enhance or impair memory
(Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Harley,
2004). Prediction errors arise from per-
ceived discrepancies between expected
and actual outcomes, and are therefore
sensitive to changes in the context in which
salient stimuli occur. In Madan et al.’s
list-discrimination task, participants re-
learned the high- and low-value words
(along with novel words) in unrewarded
lists. Thus, their finding that previous
rewards impair rather than enhance mem-
ory binding to a new temporal contextmay
reflect the influence of prediction errors
on memory-updating processes driven by
catecholamines.
The hippocampus represents associa-
tive information and selectively binds
or unbinds contextual information
in a manner consistent with predic-
tion errors (Mizumori, 2013). Thus,
in the study by Madan et al. (2012),
reduced DA in the hippocampus may
have impaired contextual binding due
to a lack of reward reinforcement dur-
ing re-learning (i.e., negative prediction
error). Contextual mismatches also
engage the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),
which helps update memory represen-
tations to account for shifting reward
contingencies, such as during reversal
learning (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Rolls,
2004). Similarly, in monkeys, phasic
NE release signals changes in stimulus-
reward associations (Aston-Jones et al.,
1997), a process that is likely driven by
context-specific inputs from the OFC
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Taken
together, these findings suggest that
arousal’s influence on associative memory
may be determined by catecholaminer-
gic modulation of brain structures that
track the predictive value of contextual
information.
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An interesting implication of this
prediction error account is that
punishment-related incentives should
enhance associative binding during the
list-discrimination task. Updating previ-
ously threatening stimuli to represent a
safer environment would support mem-
ory of cues that also promote wellbeing.
However, this account contradicts the pre-
vailing view that arousal-induced memory
impairments are invariant to stimulus
valence (Mather and Knight, 2008). Thus,
one alternative explanation is that arousal’s
selective influence on binding is not deter-
mined by valence but rather by the priority
of the context in which an arousing item is
encoded.
According to the arousal-biased compe-
tition (ABC) theory, arousal will amplify
the effects of priority such that memory
of goal-relevant stimuli is enhanced, while
memory of less important information
is suppressed (Mather and Sutherland,
2011). Since there was no instruction to
pay special attention to the new lists in
Madan et al.’s study, any arousal induced
by remembering a prior reward would
impair context binding. However, if the
experimenters explicitly directed partici-
pants to prioritize learning the current
list context, ABC theory would predict
that arousal should enhance rather than
impair binding of high-value words to
their current list. Consistent with this
account, one recent study demonstrated
that harbinger cues that predict emo-
tional stimuli enhance rather than impair
associative binding when participants are
made aware of their contingencies (Sakaki
et al., 2014). We propose that cate-
cholamines also play a key role in ABC,
since they mediate arousal’s selective influ-
ence on cognitive processing (Robbins and
Arnsten, 2009).
In summary, Madan et al.’s findings
underscore that adaptive behavior not only
relies on the ability of rewards to enhance
memory of significant stimuli but to also
impair binding of new contextual asso-
ciations that do not predict such events.
We propose that DA and NE help deter-
mine reward’s divergent effects on mem-
ory by interacting with regions that update
the salience and priority of a stimu-
lus. Whereas such neuromodulation opti-
mizes wellbeing under normal circum-
stances, acute stress appears to hijack these
mechanisms in ways harmful to behav-
ior. Acute stress amplifies reward salience
(Mather and Lighthall, 2012), resulting in
a shift from goal-directed processes toward
habitual responding (Schwabe and Wolf,
2011). This stress-induced shift appears
to be driven by elevated levels of cat-
echolamines and glucocorticoids in the
OFC (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009), which
reduce its sensitivity to reward devaluation
(van Eimeren et al., 2009; Schwabe et al.,
2011, 2012). Under normal circumstances,
the updating of emotional but not neutral
associations relies on greater OFC activa-
tion (Sakaki et al., 2011; Nashiro et al.,
2012, 2013). Thus, the impairing effects
of elevated stress hormones on OFC func-
tion may be one mechanism by which
devalued items proactively interfere with
memory. Ultimately, understanding how
arousal affects associative memory has
important implications for other patholo-
gies, such as post-traumatic stress disor-
der, in which the inability to restrict fear to
the appropriate context leads to intrusive
thoughts and impairs day-to-day life.
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